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Abstract  
 
Innovations in biotechnology, computer science, and engineering throughout the late 20th 
and early 21st centuries dramatically expanded possible modes of data-based surveillance 
and personal identification. More specifically, new technologies facilitated enormous 
growth in the biometrics sector. The response to the explosion of biometric technologies 
was two-fold. While intelligence agencies, militaries, and multinational corporations 
embraced new opportunities to fortify and expand security measures, many individuals 
objected to what they perceived as serious threats to privacy and bodily autonomy. These 
reactions spurred both further technological innovation, and a simultaneous proliferation 
of hastily drafted policies, laws, and regulations governing the collection, use, and sharing 
of biometric data. In this paper, I argue that these policies are predicated on a 
fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of biometric information. Definitions of 
biometrics presume that “biologicalness” is binary. These definitions also imply, for a 
number of reasons, that biometric information is more dangerous than other kinds of 
personal information, therefore requiring stricter regulation. I propose an alternative 
explanation of biometrics, situating biometric information on a larger spectrum of 
personal information, rather than in a discrete category of its own. This revised definition 
of biometrics is necessary to effectively regulate personal information, particularly as the 
trend of rapid technological growth and change continues. I focus, in particular, on the 
implications of these findings in a transnational context, where transmission of personal 
information is largely unregulated, and has significant impact on international relations, 
security, and individual privacy.  
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1. Introduction 
On January 28, 2001, 71,921 football fans flooded into the Raymond James Stadium 
in Tampa, Florida.1 The sports enthusiasts donned jerseys, painted their faces, 
purchased beer and nachos, and settled into their seats. They did not yet know 
that the Baltimore Ravens would win. They did not yet know that, seven months 
later, a major terrorist attack would devastate the United States and transform the 
nature of international security. And they did not yet know that their faces would 
be scanned, analyzed, and compared to a massive database of digital mug shots—
all as part of large-scale operation to test the capacity of a new facial recognition 
software.2  
This new facial recognition software, Facefinder, was developed by Viisage, 
Inc., Raytheon Co., and Graphco Technologies, Inc. Viisage, Inc.3 Its collaborators 
loaned the system to the Tampa Police Department free of charge. The Police 
Department implemented the surveillance and data collection program, working 
with the Federal Bureau of Investigation to compare results to a large database of 
wanted criminals and terrorist suspects for comparison.4 The Super Bowl provided 
a convenient testing ground for the new technology, although the Police 
Department and the FBI hoped that the program would effectively identify any 
                                                 
1 "Super Bowl History," FootballDB.com, http://www.footballdb.com/seasons/super-bowls.html. 
2 John D. Woodward, “Super Bowl Surveillance: Facing Up to Biometrics,” Santa Monica, CA: RAND 
Corporation, 2001. http://www.rand.org/pubs/issue_papers/IP209.html.   
3 Vickie Chachere, "Biometrics Used to Detect Criminals at Super Bowl," ABC News, 
http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/story?id=98871&page=1.  
4 John D. Woodward, “Super Bowl Surveillance.”  
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suspected terrorists at an event they thought might be an easy attack target.5 
While the Tampa Police Department did not identify or apprehend any suspected 
terrorists, it did identify nineteen petty criminals with outstanding arrests. They 
did not detain or question the identified criminals, however, as the project’s 
primary purpose was to test the capacity of the software.6  
The press published details about the facial recognition operation a few 
days after the Baltimore Ravens defeated the New York Giants in Super Bowl 
XXXV. Randall Marshall, the legal director for the American Civil Liberties Union 
of Florida, commented to the New York Times: “This is yet another example of 
technology outpacing the protection of people's civil liberties. It has a very Big 
Brother feel to it.''7 Super Bowl attendees and concerned citizens alike seemed to 
agree with Marshall’s sentiment, expressing concern about privacy violations and 
government control of personal information.8  
The Super Bowl experiment constituted the first large-scale use of modern 
biometric technology on the American public. The FBI defines biometrics as “the 
measurable biological (anatomical and physiological) or behavioral characteristics 
used for identification of an individual.”9 Biometric technologies, then, are the 
tools used to capture, analyze, and disseminate biometric information.  
                                                 
5 Dana Canedy, "Tampa Scans the Faces in Its Crowds for Criminals," The New York Times, July 03, 2001, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/04/us/tampa-scans-the-faces-in-its-crowds-for-criminals.html.  
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid.  
8 Ibid. 
9 "Fingerprints and Other Biometrics," FBI, May 03, 2016. https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/fingerprints-and-
other-biometrics.  
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While advances in biometrics excited the intelligence community, they 
concerned private citizens. The political and security ramifications of the 9/11 
terrorist attacks, along with the rapid development of new biometric technologies, 
prompted a wave of research on biometrics. In 2001 and 2002, SEARCH, an 
American nonprofit research organization with an emphasis on privacy and 
information,10 commissioned a survey on public attitudes toward the use of 
biometric technologies.11 In more recent years, a number of organizations and 
agencies—ranging from the Consumer Technology Association12 to the Pew 
Research Center13 to the UK House of Commons14—have conducted public opinion 
surveys on biometrics, both within the United States and abroad.15 While these 
surveys vary somewhat in their relative structures and emphases, they all reflect 
the general trends observed in the 2001 SEARCH survey: people generally express 
support for the use of biometric technologies in their capacity as anti-terrorism, 
public safety, and public welfare tools, whereas they disapprove of the use of 
biometric technologies to enable domestic surveillance or increase corporate 
efficiency. In 2016, for example, the International Biometrics Association found 
that 63% of U.S. adults were open to the use of biometrics for altruistic purposes 
                                                 
10 "About Us," SEARCH, http://www.search.org/about-search/.  
11 “Public Attitudes toward the Uses of Biometric Identification Technologies by Government and the Private 
Sector,” Working Paper, SEARCH, 2002. 
12 “Recent Opinion Surveys on Public Perception of Biometrics,” Issue Brief, International Biometrics Identity 
Association, 2017. 
13 Lee Rainie and Maeve Duggan, "Scenario: Workplace Security and Tracking," Pew Research Center, January 
14, 2016, http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/01/14/scenario-workplace-security-and-tracking/.  
14 Current and Future Uses of Biometric Data and Technologies, Issue Brief. Science and Technology Committee, 
U.K. House of Commons, 2015. 
15 Most public opinion surveys on biometrics were conducted in the United States, Canada, the United 
Kingdom, and in a handful of other European Union countries. There does not appear to be survey data on 
public attitudes towards biometrics in non-American and non-European countries, even in places like China 
and India where the use of biometric technologies is widespread.  
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like medical research, while 70% of U.S. adults had neutral sentiments or were 
uncomfortable with regards to the commercial use of biometric technologies.16  
On first examination, survey subjects appear to contradict themselves; they 
are untroubled by iris scanning software when it is used to identify potential 
terrorists, but are disturbed when the very same software is employed to store 
personal information about civilians. But these subtle differences in public 
attitudes reveal an important truth about biometric technology, and about 
information technology more broadly. Survey respondents are more interested in 
the application of a given technology than in its particular form. In other words, 
the type of information collected and the mode of collection matter less than do 
the subsequent management and use of that same information.  
While individual survey respondents seem to understand that the particular 
mode of data collection matters less than its practical application, policymakers 
have yet to come to the same conclusions. Instead, policymakers and legislators 
tend to fixate on the type of technology used and the type of information collected, 
crafting narrowly tailored regulations to the technology of the moment rather than 
expanding and fortifying existing individual privacy protections.17  
Biometric technologies continue to proliferate, but policy responses are 
inconsistent, and at times incoherent. This inconsistency in biometrics policy and 
law—both domestically, and even more so internationally—is likely related in part 
                                                 
16 “Recent Opinion Surveys on Public Perception of Biometrics,” International Biometrics Identity Association, 
2017. 
17 Christopher Jensen, "The more things change, the more they stay the same: Copyright, digital technology, 
and social norms," Stanford Law Review, 2003, 531-570. 
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to the fact that the ethics discourse on biometrics is equally fragmented. As 
biometric technology becomes an increasingly quotidian component of our lives, 
and particularly as its role in multilateral intelligence relations calcifies, it is clear 
that we require a cogent understanding of what biometrics are, how biometric 
technologies work, and how biometric information should be collected, used, 
stored, and shared. Building this understanding involves examining not just the 
technologies themselves, but the theories underpinning and guiding social and 
political responses to them.  
In this paper, I examine the assumptions underpinning the current 
definition and conception of biometric information as a unique class of personal 
information and identify the ways in which these assumptions are unsubstantiated 
and often misleading. I propose an alternative framework for understanding 
biometrics in the broader context of personal information. This framework situates 
biometric information on a spectrum of personal information, rather than in a 
discrete category of its own. In establishing this framework, I not only articulate a 
more comprehensive and logically consistent definition of biometric information, 
but I also suggest how this definition might help to inform the development of 
more coherent, consistent, and durable policies regulating personal information.  
 
1.1 Why an Ethics Approach?  
While I aim to bolster my arguments with empirical information and relevant case 
studies, this paper emphasizes the ethical dilemmas regarding biometric 
 6 
technology, relying only tangentially on methods and research that fall more 
clearly in the realms of law and policy. I have two primary reasons for taking an 
ethics approach to the issue of biometric technology. 
First, biometrics law and policy are in a nascent stage. The current 
smattering of U.S. state statutes,18 international intelligence agreements,19 and 
vague policy directives do not constitute a significant library of biometrics policy 
or law. While a review and analysis of this body of information might reveal 
information about the fragmented development of technology law, the landscape 
of law and policy is changing so rapidly that I have chosen instead to focus on the 
ethical underpinnings of these topical issues. As policymakers, legislators, 
diplomats, intelligence agencies, and software developers begin to consider how 
biometrics should be treated in domestic courts and international treaties, they 
will require a firm ethical foundation from which to construct a coherent and 
levelheaded biometrics policy framework.  
The second reason that I chose to take an ethical approach to the issue of 
biometric technology has to do with its relationship to broader trends in the realm 
of personal information and privacy ethics. With biometrics as my focus, I hope to 
explore some of the fundamental ethical questions that govern our understanding 
of personal information. These questions include deep dilemmas about the nature 
of personal identity, accountability, and the persistent tension between 
                                                 
18 (740 ILCS 14/10) Biometric Information Privacy Act. 
http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/ilcs3.asp?ActID=3004&ChapterID=57%20  
19 Five Eyes, the Anglophone intelligence network, developed a bilateral strategy for sharing biometric 
information between intelligence agencies.  
United Kingdom. U.K. Border Agency. Privacy Impact Assessment of High Value Data Sharing Protocol. 2010. 
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individualism and collectivism. While a comprehensive exploration of each of 
these issues is beyond the scope of this paper, I hope that my analysis serves as a 
foundation from which to further investigate these questions.  
 
1.2 International Implications 
Social and natural scientists sometimes describe philosophy as an ivory tower 
discipline, one that isolates itself from material questions of the everyday world. 
While I bring the methods of philosophy—and ethics, in particular—to bear on 
the problem of biometric technology, I endeavor to engage with, rather than 
withdraw from, the political and social implications of my findings. In particular, I 
hope to highlight the transnational nature of these questions. Unlike the fields of 
law and policy, ethics is unconstrained by borders. It makes sense, therefore, that 
ethics constitutes the foundation of any inquiry into the undeniably global 
question of biometric technology.  
While I reject the globalist assertion that we are on the brink of a borderless 
world, it is clear that exponential technological growth20 has confused the 
traditional dynamics of international law and policy. In particular, military power 
and wealth are much less important to the creation and enforcement of 
international data protection laws than they are to other kinds of international 
policy. Because the digital world cannot be regulated according to traditional law 
enforcement methods, the regulation of personal information poses new and 
interesting challenges for international relations and policy. The transnational 
                                                 
20 Robert R. Schaller, “Moore's Law: Past, Present and Future." IEEE Spectrum 34, no. 6 (1997): 52-59. 
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regulation of data collection and sharing is basically nonexistent.21 This is in part 
because there is no transnational body that has the power to enforce the 
regulation of information flow. It is also in part because the most active collectors 
and traders of personal information are militaries and large multinational 
corporations, both powerful actors that tend to repel the kind of bureaucratic 
investigation that digital transgressions invite.  
In this paper, I do not propose a solution to the problem of an unregulated, 
transnational flow of personal information. It is optimistic to presume that we will 
ever achieve global consensus regarding regulation of the collection, analysis, and 
use of personal information. It is even more optimistic to suggest the development 
of an effective international enforcer of those regulations. However, I do posit that 
universally consistent and durable definitions of biometrics and personal 
information—independent of specific geography or technology—will enable the 
formation of more comprehensible and enforceable standards, policies, and 
international agreements.  
 
1.3 Roadmap 
In this paper, I further explore the distinction between type and application of 
personal information. I argue that, contrary to the assumptions inherent in much 
of the policy and ethics literature on biometrics, there is no clear or substantive 
difference between biometric information and other kinds of personal information. 
                                                 
21 Abraham L. Newman, “Building Transnational Civil Liberties: Transgovernmental Entrepreneurs and the 
European Data Privacy Directive," International Organization 62, no. 01 (2008): 103-130. 
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I propose an alternative framework for understanding biometrics, which 
establishes a scalar model for interpreting different kinds of personal information. 
According to this model, biometric information does not constitute a discrete 
category, but rather describes one end of a more complex spectrum of information. 
I also suggest some practical ways that this framework might be integrated into 
the formation of information policy, particularly in the context of global politics. 
The second chapter of this paper provides some background on biometrics. 
I review various definitions of “biometrics,” briefly recount the definitions, 
categories, and history of biometric technology. The third chapter presents an 
evaluation of the ethical arguments related to the collection, use, and sharing of 
biometric information. In this section, I identify problematic assumptions that 
underpin existing definitions and ethical analyses of biometrics, explaining how 
these assumptions inevitably foment a fundamental misunderstanding of personal 
information. The fourth chapter presents an alternative model of personal 
information. This model situates personal information on a spectrum rather than 
in discrete categories. The fifth chapter presents a brief case study to illustrate the 
new model of personal information. Analysis of the case study highlights the 
ethical and policy implications of reinterpreting biometrics within the alternative 
model of personal information.  
  
 10 
2. Background 
2.1 Definitions  
There is no universal consensus regarding the definition of “biometrics.” The lack 
of a clear and consistent definition reflects not only a semantic incongruity, but 
also a deep substantive confusion about what biometrics is and what it represents. 
Some characterizations of biometrics focus on the specific type of information 
collected. Illinois and Texas, two of the few states that attempt to provide rigorous 
definitions related to biometrics, define “biometric identifiers” as "a retina or iris 
scan, fingerprint, voiceprint, or scan of hand or face geometry."22 Illinois, however, 
explicitly excludes “writing samples, written signatures, photographs, human 
biological samples used for valid scientific testing or screening, demographic data, 
tattoo descriptions, or physical descriptions such as height, weight, hair color, [and] 
eye color,"23 while Texas does not. These legal definitions promise to outlive their 
relevance quickly as new biometric technologies are developed. 
 Other definitions of biometric information are less concerned with the 
exact type of information, and more concerned with the capacity of certain 
information to identify individuals. A bill pending in the Washington State 
legislature defines a biometric identifier as a “characteristic, whether biological, 
behavioral, or both, that enables automated recognition of an individual and is 
                                                 
22 (740 ILCS 14/10) Biometric Information Privacy Act, 
http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/ilcs3.asp?ActID=3004&ChapterID=57%20.   
23 Ibid.  
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inherently sensitive, including but not limited to fingerprints, DNA, hand 
geometry, palm print, and iris scan.” The bill goes on to concede that this 
definition “also includes less sensitive identifiers, including, but not limited to 
facial imaging, voice, and gait when used specifically for identification purposes.”24 
According to this definition, practically any type of information used for 
identification purposes might be governed under this biometrics bill. The FBI has a 
similar understanding, defining biometrics as “the measurable biological 
(anatomical and physiological) or behavioral characteristics used for identification 
of an individual.”25 The Biometrics Institute avoids any explicit definition of 
biometrics altogether, stating states that a biometric characteristic is the 
“biological and behavioural characteristic of an individual from which 
distinguishing, repeatable biometric features can be extracted for the purpose of 
biometric recognition."26  
It is clear that variation in definitions of “biometrics” does not simply 
involve the employment of different vocabularies, but also the use of entirely 
different standards. Some definitions pinpoint specific technologies or biometric 
identifiers, while others describe the ability of certain technologies to 
automatically identify or recognize individuals. While all of these definitions 
simulate specificity, the precision is largely superficial. Further examination reveals 
that the definitions are so vague that it is impossible to determine in practice what 
                                                 
24 Washington State House Bill 1094, 2017, http://app.leg.wa.gov/billsummary?BillNumber=1094&Year=2015.     
25 "Fingerprints and Other Biometrics," FBI, May 03, 2016, https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/fingerprints-and-
other-biometrics.  
26 "Definition of biometrics," Biometrics Institute, http://www.biometricsinstitute.org/pages/definition-of-
biometrics.html.  
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information counts as “biometric” and what information does not. It is worth 
noting that the definitions of biometrics described above are among the most 
robust. Law enforcement agencies and legislative bodies are forced to furnish 
definitions related to the statues they enforce and create. But in many contexts, 
particularly in the realm of academia, the word “biometrics” goes undefined. This 
definitional omission implies the existence of an uncontroversial and universal 
understanding of biometrics, such that the word does not warrant characterization. 
In neglecting to define the subject of their work, ethicists and other scholars miss a 
central question: what is biometrics? 
 
2.2 Hard and Soft Biometrics  
While there is no adequate definition of biometrics, scholars and engineers have 
proposed a definitional distinction between types of biometrics. Most existing 
definitions of biometrics imply that a biometric characteristic or identifier should 
uniquely identify an individual. But even this central concept is muddied when we 
consider the inclusion of “behavioral characteristics.” Behavioral characteristics 
include typing rhythm, gait,27 and voice,28 many of which cannot reliably 
authenticate individual identities on their own, but which can reliably verify an 
                                                 
27 Robertas Damaševičius, et al., "Smartphone User Identity Verification Using Gait 
Characteristics," Symmetry 8, no. 10 (2016): 100.  
28 Sahidullah, Md, “Enhancement of Speaker Recognition Performance Using Block Level, Relative and 
Temporal Information of Subband Energies," PhD Thesis, 2015. 
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individual’s identity (e.g. based on recorded histories of typing patterns).29 
Researchers have recently coined the term, “behaviometrics,” to more accurately 
describe this class of personal characteristics.30 This term might be useful, but 
most scholars, legislators, and policymakers include both “biological” and 
“behavioral” information in their definitions of biometrics. When they do 
distinguish between types of information, they use the terms “hard” or “first 
generation” biometrics to describe purely “biological” information like fingerprints 
or iris scans, and “soft” or “second generation” biometrics to describe “behavioral” 
information, like gait and typing patterns.31  
The distinction between hard and soft biometrics is not purely descriptive; 
it also has normative implications. In an article on the ethics of second-generation 
biometrics, Sutrop and Laas-Mikko (2012) argue that first generation biometric 
information is more conducive to neutral identification. In other words, first-
generation biometrics are primarily collected and used to confer rights, 
responsibilities, and entitlements on a positively identified person. Sutrop and 
Laas-Mikko observe that second-generation biometrics, on the other hand, are less 
individually specific, and therefore more conducive to the classification and 
characterization of groups of people.32 
                                                 
29 Nisenson, Mordechai, Ido Yariv, Ran El-Yaniv, and Ron Meir. "Towards behaviometric security systems: 
Learning to identify a typist." In European Conference on Principles of Data Mining and Knowledge Discovery, 
pp. 363-374. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2003. 
30 Ibid.  
31 Sutrop, Margit, and Katrin Laas-Mikko. "From Identity Verification to Behavior Prediction: Ethical 
Implications of Second Generation Biometrics." Review of Policy Research 29, no. 1 (2012): 21-36.  
32 Ibid.  
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According to Sutrop and Laas-Mikko, the divergence in application of these 
two classes of biometric information stems from the fact that first-generation 
biometrics measure individually unique biological traits, that if collected and 
analyzed correctly, can only be used to identify a single person. Second-generation 
biometrics involves traits that are not necessarily unique, and are therefore more 
conducive to characterization.33 For example, a particular type of gait might be 
associated with a certain type of behavior, based on analysis of historical data. 
Sutrop and Laas-Mikko conclude that the expansion of second-generation 
biometrics could result in unjustified stigmatization and discrimination, whereas 
this risk is less potent with regard to first-generation biometrics.  
Sutrop and Laas-Mikko do not rely on empirical arguments to make their 
claim, so it is unclear whether their conclusions about the relative discriminatory 
capacities of hard and soft biometrics are true. When they suggest that a 
characteristic such as gait might be used to characterize and unjustly target groups 
of people, they do not provide a specific example of this occurring, nor do they 
explain exactly how it would happen in reality. I return to their argument in a later 
section when I discuss theories about the body as a primary source of identity-
based discrimination and stigmatization.  
The soft-hard biometrics distinction is an attempt to resolve the 
imprecision of the word “biometrics.” As biometric technologies expanded, 
allowing for the identification of people based on secondary traits like typing 
                                                 
33 When they assert that second generation biometrics are not “unique,” Sutrop and Laas-Mikko intend that 
the analysis of a person’s gait is less reliable in the project of positively identifying an individual than it is in 
contributing to a more holistic characterization of a given person. 
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pattern and voice, it became unclear how these kinds of information—which were 
not strictly biological—fit into a definition of biometrics. It made sense to 
articulate the existence of sub-categories under the umbrella term, “biometrics.” 
While the distinction is useful in some ways, it ultimately perpetuates a 
misunderstanding of the nature of personal information, and consequently 
generates confused and inconsistent ethical analyses and policy proposals.  
My central argument revolves around the imprecision of the word, and the 
concept of, “biometrics.” In this paper, I attempt to define biometrics to the best of 
my ability without committing to any particular institutional definition. As I 
develop my argument, I interrogate the definitions of biometrics described above, 
highlighting their inability to effectively and consistently identify specific 
technologies or kinds of information.  
 
2.3 History of Biometric Technologies  
The history of biometric technology begins with Alphonse Bertillon, a Parisian 
anthropologist and police desk clerk.34 In the late 19th century, Bertillon developed 
a criminal identification system that involved the collection and comparison of 
specific biological markers. Bertillon relied on physiological measurements of bone 
structures and body parts, as well as on “soft biometric” identifiers such as 
birthmarks, tattoos and scars. He estimated that if fourteen independent traits 
were used, the odds of creating two identical records, and consequently 
                                                 
34 John Pike, "History of Biometrics," Global Security, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/systems/biometrics-history.htm.  
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misidentifying a suspected criminal, would be 286,435,456 to one.35 Bertillon’s 
system was arduous and time-consuming. It relied on fickle biometric identifiers 
that were challenging to measure precisely and frustratingly unstable throughout 
childhood and adolescence. Furthermore, none of these characteristics alone had 
the capacity to uniquely identify an individual. Only when aggregated could they 
reliably identify a suspect. Nevertheless, Bertillon’s system, or “Bertillonage” as it 
was called, greatly influenced the development of biometric technologies and 
programs.  
 In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, a more accurate and streamlined 
method that used individual fingerprints supplanted Bertillonage.36 While 
fingerprints have been used as personal signatures since the 14th century B.C.E in 
China, they were not understood to be unique physiological markers of identity 
until Dr. William Faulds and William Herschel separately and simultaneously 
came to the conclusion that fingerprints serve as a sort of unique individual code 
for each person. The Henry Classification system that is still used today was named 
after Edward Henry, who designed and first implemented the system in India in 
1897.37 
 Biometric technologies proliferated in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. 
During this biometric boom, computing and information processing capacity 
exploded, biotechnology research expanded its reach, and concerns about 
international security emerged at the forefront of American and European politics. 
                                                 
35 Ibid.  
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid.  
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Iris scans, face scans, and hand geometries became integral components of 
security, both in public and private sectors.38 New biometric technologies, 
particularly those measuring soft biometric characteristics like typing patterns, are 
rapidly becoming a part of the standard security toolbox.39 It is likely that software 
developers and biotechnology researchers will refine the accuracy and overall 
efficacy of existing biometric technologies, while continuing to devise new 
methods for the collection, storage, and sharing of biometric information. In 
recent years, public pressure and internal concern about the security of biometric 
information has prompted an effort to develop technological safeguards against 
the accidental or intentional leaking or sharing of biometric information.40  
 Even as biometric technologies become increasingly sophisticated and 
secure, ethical understandings of these technologies remain confused and 
fragmented. As a result, biometric policy and law is inconsistent, and often unclear. 
The proliferation of biometric technologies across industries is unlikely to slow. In 
fact, the collection, analysis, and sharing of biometric information will permeate 
more sectors as time progresses. It is therefore essential that we pause for a 
moment to carefully define the problems that we face, so that we may better 
resolve those problems in a principled and comprehensive manner.  
                                                 
38 Arun Ross et al., "Introduction to Multibiometrics," In Handbook of Biometrics, pp. 271-292. Springer US, 
2008. 
39 Mordechai Nisenson, et al., "Towards Behaviometric Security Systems: Learning to Identify a Typist," 
In European Conference on Principles of Data Mining and Knowledge Discovery, pp. 363-374, Springer Berlin 
Heidelberg, 2003. 
40 “Protecting biometric data with Extended Access Control: Securing biometric datasets in electronic 
identification documents,” Technical paper, Entrust, 2014. 
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In the section that follows, I describe the major ethical commentaries on 
biometrics, emphasizing the kinds of assumptions that these commentaries make. 
In doing this, I hope to show that these unsupported assumptions and 
inconsistencies stem from a fundamentally faulty understanding of biometrics and 
its relationship to personal information more broadly.   
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3.  Arguments for “Biometrics” and Why They Fail 
Literature on the technology of biometrics abounds. Biometrics is ubiquitous; it 
now undergirds the security infrastructure of countless industries, including 
banking, agriculture, social media, and national security. As the technologies 
become more sophisticated and as applications of these technologies broaden in 
scope, software developers and engineers increasingly publish their findings 
related specifically to the collection, analysis, and management of biometric 
information.  
 While there is plenty of technical material on biometrics, literature on the 
ethical and legal implication of biometrics is remarkably sparse. In general, 
technology tends to precede ethics and law.41 It often takes decades to understand 
the implications of new technologies, and even longer to determine the 
appropriate legislative and ethical responses. The biometrics boom, while it has 
generated significant contributions to the literature on bioengineering, bio-
statistics, and other related disciplines, has not yet initiated a robust and coherent 
scholarly conversation on the ethics of biometrics. The scholarly conversation—in 
its current nascent state—is fragmented and incomplete.  
Much of the literature on biometrics, either implicitly or explicitly, asserts 
that biometric technology presents unique ethical issues. This analysis fails to 1) 
define biometrics, and 2) articulate the ethical and legal distinctions between 
biometric information, and other kinds of personal information. If biometric 
                                                 
41 Vivek Wadhwa, "Laws and Ethics Can't Keep Pace with Technology," MIT Technology Review, September 19, 
2014, https://www.technologyreview.com/s/526401/laws-and-ethics-cant-keep-pace-with-technology/.  
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technologies present unique concerns, scholars must clearly articulate these 
concerns.  
Biometrics scholarship also tends to be alarmist; scholars warn that 
biometrics pose significant ethical and practical threats, and some have even 
suggested a complete rejection of the suspect technologies until the ethical and 
practical threats have been addressed. These alarmist views do not represent the 
entirety of biometrics scholarship; there are positions that take a more moderate 
stance, balancing the practical benefits of biometric technologies against concerns 
about particular components of these technologies.  
In this chapter, I aim to construct a map of the existing conversation on 
biometric ethics. In particular, I interrogate arguments that support the 
assumption that biometric information is categorically different than other kinds 
of personal information. Rather than review the topical issues with which scholars 
of biometric ethics concern themselves—including consent, privacy, and personal 
identity—I identify the primary fallacies that philosophers and ethicists make in 
their discourse on biometrics. After considering some of the most compelling 
arguments in support of special ethical standards for biometric information, I will 
be prepared to propose an alternative definition of biometrics.  
First, I address the argument that biometric information facilitates 
discrimination. Next, I respond to the assertion that biometric information is 
uniquely related to bodily integrity. Finally, I interrogate the assumption that 
biometric information is fundamentally more personal, or more special, than other 
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kinds of personal information. For each claim, I present the argument in full and 
explain why it fails. 
 
3.1 Discrimination  
The ethics literature on biometrics is replete with warnings about the 
discriminatory potential of biometric technologies. According to these arguments, 
biometric information is fundamentally more conducive to discrimination than 
non-biometric information. Consequently, the collection and use of biometric 
information should be regulated separately, and more strictly, than the collection 
and use of non-biometric information. If the discrimination argument were true, it 
would be reasonable to advocate a separate and more stringent regulation of 
biometric information. However, I argue that the discrimination argument is 
incorrect. Because biometrics is not fundamentally discriminatory in nature, the 
discrimination argument does not give us a reason to conceive of biometric 
information as a distinct category.  
 
3.1.1 The Discrimination Argument  
 
The discrimination argument asserts that there is something unique about 
biometric information that lends itself to discriminatory applications. Some 
scholars make explicit arguments about the discriminatory potential of biometric 
information. For example, Sutrop and Laas-Mikko claim that biometric 
information—second-generation biometric information, in particular—will be 
used to identify “risk-positive” characteristics, build predictive models using those 
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characteristics, and discriminate against individuals according to broad 
classifications. 42 Jennifer Poudrier, in her contribution to a book on the social 
implications of surveillance, hypothesizes that the collection of biometric 
information for the purpose of social services might actually be used to 
discriminate against marginalized groups. She uses the example of health 
information collected on First Nations people in Canada to support her claim.43 
Other scholars, including Alterman (2003) and Van der Ploeg (2003), while they do 
not center the question of discrimination in their respective papers, make implicit 
assumptions about the discriminatory potential of biometrics information. 
 The discrimination argument involves two distinct questions. The first 
question is empirical in nature: is biometric information, in practice, used in more 
discriminatory ways than other types of personal information? Given that there is 
not sufficient data to defend or dismantle the argument that biometric 
information is applied in distinctly discriminatory ways, it is impossible to answer 
this empirical question. Conjectures about the possible discriminatory applications 
of biometric information, like the one that Poudrier makes in her paper about 
health information and First Nations people, do not furnish evidence in support of 
this empirical claim. To answer this question, it would be necessary to define each 
variable—biometric information, personal information, and discrimination—and 
to measure the discriminatory applications of each kind of information across 
                                                 
42 Margit Sutrop and Katrin Laas-Mikko, "From Identity Verification to Behavior Prediction: Ethical 
Implications of Second Generation Biometrics," Review of Policy Research 29, no. 1 (2012): 21-36. 
43 J. Poudrier, ‘Racial’ Categories and Health Risks. Surveillance as Social Sorting: Privacy, Risk, and Digital 
Discrimination, edited by David Lyon, 2003, 111. 
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sectors and industries. Because this study has not yet been conducted, we cannot 
draw conclusions with regards to this question.  
The second question is more conceptual in nature: is there something 
fundamental about biometric information that lends itself to discriminatory 
applications? Many scholars, including Georgio Agamben (2004) and Emilio 
Mordini (2009), are confident that there is something fundamental about 
biometric information that lends itself to discriminatory applications. Claims that 
biometric information is more conducive to discrimination than other types of 
information tend to assume that identity—and therefore, prejudice—is rooted in 
biology and physiology. In other words, these authors are concerned that 
biometric information conveys essential facts about a person’s identity (e.g. his 
race or gender), and therefore could easily be used in discriminatory ways, either 
intentionally or inadvertently. This assumption underlies not only philosophical 
ruminations on the dangers of biometrics, but also legislative decisions and public 
opinion.  
 
3.1.2 Why the Discrimination Argument Fails   
If the discrimination argument were true, there would be good reason to conceive 
of biometric information as an independent category of personal information, 
deserving of stricter regulation. However, it is clear that there is nothing special 
about biometric information that makes it fundamentally more discriminatory in 
nature. In fact, it is likely that other kinds of personal information have more 
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discriminatory potential. I first show why the discrimination argument fails, and I 
then suggest why other kinds of personal information might actually be more 
dangerous with regards to discrimination.  
First, I want to reiterate that there is no empirical evidence in support of 
the discrimination argument. This means that we cannot know whether or not the 
use of biometric information is more discriminatory in practice than the use of 
other kinds of personal information. While we cannot answer the empirical 
question, we can interrogate the assumptions underpinning the conceptual claim 
that biometric information is fundamentally more discriminatory than other kinds 
of personal information. 
The discrimination argument is built on a faulty logic that overestimates the 
biological and physiological bases of identity. The discrimination argument can be 
summarized as follows: 
1. Discrimination occurs on the basis of identity. 
2. Some marginalized identities are determined by biology and physiology. 44  
3. Biometric information, by definition, is biological and physiological. 
4. Biometric information is fundamentally more conducive to discrimination 
than other types of personal information.  
   
I accept (1). In general, discrimination—at least, the type of discrimination with 
which we are concerned—is perpetrated on the basis of identity. People are 
grouped based on their real or perceived characteristics and are treated differently 
according to their group membership. If (2) were correct, then (3) and (4) would 
                                                 
44 Proponents of this argument do not assert that “identity” is always biological or physiological, but rather 
that particularly sensitive identities like race and gender, are biologically and physiologically determined.  
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naturally be true.45 However, the logic of the discrimination argument falls apart in 
premise (2). There are, of course, many identity categories. Most ethicists 
concerned with the discriminatory potential of biometric information focus on 
race. In the discussion that follows, I focus my objections to this argument on race 
as well. It is worth noting, however, that my objections also apply to the question 
of gender discrimination.  
While there are biological and physiological traits and characteristics 
associated with identity, biometric information alone cannot determine a person’s 
identity. The assumption that biometric information communicates useful facts 
about a person’s identity fails to acknowledge the complex and multifactorial 
nature of identity. Identity categories are fluid, and are more closely linked to 
social perception than they are to an objective biological reality. Sally Haslanger, in 
her seminal work on the definition of race and gender, construes both race and 
gender as real and social categories.46 In other words, race and gender exist in the 
world; we know this because people are grouped on the basis of their race and 
gender every day. However, these groupings have much more to do with the social 
perception of identity than they do with any objective or biological fact about an 
individual.  
Kwame Anthony Appiah makes a similar argument, explaining that racial 
categories are imagined. He writes, “In humans, however you define the major 
                                                 
45 I actually do take issue with (3), although that premise is not relevant to my argument here. I argue that I 
think it is almost impossible to distinguish between “biological” and “non-biological” information. I will 
explore this dilemma later in this paper.  
46 Sally Haslanger, "Gender and Race: (What) Are They? (What) Do We Want Them To Be?" Nous 34, no. 1 
(2000): 51. 
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races, the biological variability within them is almost as great as the biological 
variation within the species as a whole.”47 Evolutionary biologists confirm this 
claim. In fact, there is significantly more genetic variation within racial groups than 
there is between them.48 This genetic variation does not appear exclusively in 
individual DNA, but also manifests in other biological and physiological identifiers. 
There are very few specific biometric identifiers that can accurately determine a 
person’s race. For example, almost any person who is positive for sickle-cell 
anemia is likely to be black. However, it remains almost impossible to determine a 
person’s race based solely on biological information. 
Based on these analyses, it is clear that biometric information alone cannot 
reliably determine a person’s race or gender. In general, biological and 
physiological information is not sufficient to assign a person to an identity group 
and to discriminate accordingly. It is therefore impossible that biometric 
information has more discriminatory potential than other kinds of personal 
information.  
Some scholars, including Sutrop and Laas-Mikko (2012) concede that hard 
biometric information may not be discriminatory, but claim that soft biometric 
information is the central concern. In other words, they are not concerned with 
the pure biological and physiological identifiers like fingerprints, DNA, and iris 
scans, but they are worried about identifiers like gait, typing patterns, and face 
                                                 
47 K.A. Appiah, “Race, Culture, Identity: Misunderstood Connections,” Tanner Lectures on Human Values, 
1996, 17, 95 
48 Lynn B. Jorde, and Stephen P. Wooding, "Genetic Variation, Classification and ‘Race'," Nature Genetics 36 
(2004): S28-S33. 
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geometry. I argue that in making this argument, these scholars actually argue 
against the claim that biometric information is fundamentally dangerous. Instead, 
they gesture towards the many ways in which other kinds of personal information 
can be used in discriminatory fashions. 
Algorithmic bias is a popular topic in technology scholarship today and the 
literature is replete with tales of discriminatory outputs from supposedly objective 
tools. One particularly egregious example that surfaced in the summer of 2016 
received intense media attention. This story involved the classification of black 
individuals as “gorillas” by Google Photos facial recognition software.49  The people 
who had mistakenly been labeled “gorillas” in a picture on Google photos 
complained publicly about the offense, prompting an immediate response from 
Google. The company apologized for the mistake and removed the “gorilla” tag 
from their software. Despite the swift response, the event inspired a backlash 
against the use of biometric technologies more broadly.  
While Google’s program created racist outputs, the origin of the bias 
remains unclear. Even though Google promised to work on the algorithm itself to 
improve its accuracy and to eliminate the problematic tagging feature, web 
developers were unable to ascertain why their program had produced such a 
specifically racist result.50  It is unclear whether or not Google has since addressed 
                                                 
49 Alistair Barr, "Google Mistakenly Tags Black People as ‘Gorillas,’ Showing Limits of Algorithms," The Wall 
Street Journal, July 02, 2015, http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2015/07/01/google-mistakenly-tags-black-people-as-
gorillas-showing-limits-of-algorithms/.  
50 The Google Photos software relies on machine learning, a type of artificial intelligence that relies on 
exposure to information to accurately distinguish between objects. Google proposes that their system simply 
hadn’t had enough time to learn the difference between gorillas and of black people to accurately distinguish 
between the two. This conclusion, however, does not explain why white people were not inaccurately 
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the underlying issue, but according to the information that is publicly available, 
Google simply resorted to deleting the “gorilla” tag altogether.  
The Google case is an example of how soft biometric might be used in a 
discriminatory fashion. Scholars like Sutrop and Laas-Mikko (2012) warn that this 
is exactly the kind of thing that will happen if we do not carefully monitor and 
regulate the application of soft biometric technologies. However, Sutrop and Laas-
Mikko—and the many other scholars who share their concerns about soft 
biometrics—make a category mistake. If biometric information is understood to be 
biological or physiological information that uniquely identifies an individual, then 
“soft biometrics” does not fall clearly into the definition of biometrics at all. The 
color of a person’s face (as in the Google case) is not a biological fact alone. Skin 
color certainly has biological determinants, but it is also affected by environmental 
factors like time spent in the sun, tanning products, lighting when the picture was 
captured, and so on. Other soft biometric identifiers are even less biological; 
consider typing patterns and gait, for example.  
In claiming that soft biometrics are more dangerous than hard biometrics, 
these scholars essentially admit that it is not the biological nature of the 
information that is dangerous (as they assert elsewhere in their argument), but 
that as we move farther away from “hard biometrics,” it becomes easier to 
discriminate on the basis of identity.  
                                                                                                                                                 
identified as polar bears. It is possible that the stock images Google used to inform its AI software did not 
include many photographs of people with black and brown skin, which resulted in software that assumed an 
equation between “human” and “white.” 
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This conclusion supports my assertion that not only is biological 
information not especially discriminatory in nature, but that it is actually less 
discriminatory than other kinds of personal information. For example, a person’s 
zip code is much more likely to betray his race than his fingerprint, or even his 
face geometry. A person’s search history or social media presence is more likely to 
betray his gender than a fingerprint, or even a DNA sample. Because, as Haslanger 
and Appiah assert, identity is primarily socially constructed and socially perceived, 
social and environmental information about a person’s life will be much more 
telling than purely biological and physiological information in attempting to 
determine a person’s identity.  
Based on this analysis, I conclude that hard biometric data do not 
fundamentally facilitate discrimination. Furthermore, I demonstrate that soft 
biometric information is not solely biological, and therefore falls more clearly into 
the category of “other personal information.” Finally, I contend that non-biometric, 
or “soft biometric,” information is actually more conducive to discriminatory 
applications than is biometric information.  
 
3.2 Bodily Integrity  
I have now established that biometric information is not especially conducive to 
discrimination. However, there is a different kind of argument related to 
biometrics and discrimination. Some scholars, including Georgio Agamben and 
Irma van der Ploeg, assert that whether or not biometric information is more likely 
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than other kinds of personal information to be applied in discriminatory ways, it is 
especially bad to discriminate on the basis of biometric information. This 
argument has less to do with the discriminatory potential of one type of 
information over another, and more to do with the intrinsic nature of that 
information.  
Proponents of the bodily integrity argument contend that control over one’s 
own biometric information equates to control over one’s bodily integrity. 
According to this argument, biometric information—because it has to do with a 
person’s body—is innately more valuable than other kinds of information. As a 
consequence, it is more dangerous—both morally and practically—if other people 
have access to an individual’s biometric information. The collection, analysis, and 
sharing of biometric information has the potential to compromise a person’s 
fundamental bodily integrity. If the bodily integrity argument were true, then it 
would make sense to conceive of biometric information as a distinct category of 
personal information, and to regulate it accordingly. However, I argue that the 
bodily integrity argument is incorrect, and therefore does not provide a 
justification for the distinct conception and regulation of biometric information.  
 
3.2.1 The Bodily Integrity Argument  
Scholars defend the bodily integrity argument by appealing to a variety of 
justifications. However, their central claim is that there is something inexplicable 
and inviolable about the physical body that deserves special respect. Irma van der 
Ploeg and Anton Alterman, for example, both assert that there is something 
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unique and deeply personal about biometric information. Van der Ploeg states, 
“Embodiment is central to individuality and identity in a way that a person’s social 
security number, or…car rental records are not.”51 In other words, she believes that 
information about her body has to do with her very existence in the world, while 
information about where she lives or how the government identifies her is simply 
meta-data about her life. Anton Alterman makes a similar claim, appealing to an 
individual’s right to privacy. He argues that there is value in cohesion between the 
“psychological” and “biological” self, and that for this cohesion to exist, an 
individual must be the sole proprietor and controller of information about his own 
body.52 Giorgio Agamben, a vocal opponent of biometrics, expresses concern about 
“bio-political tattooing,” or the association of certain biometric variables with a 
person’s identity, a practice that he associates with treatment of the Jews during 
the Holocaust.53 Agamben, van der Ploeg, and Alterman all agree that there is 
something unique and inviolable about the body, and that the collection, analysis, 
and sharing of biometric information contravenes a person’s bodily integrity. 
The bodily integrity argument rests on the assumption that biometric 
information is the body. In other words, if Person A controls Person B’s biometric 
information, Person A controls Person B’s body. If this were true, the collection, 
analysis, and sharing of biometric information would be deeply problematic. This 
argument leads to the natural conclusion that any manipulation of biometric 
                                                 
51 Irma Van der Ploeg,  "Biometrics and the Body as Information," Surveillance as Social Sorting: Privacy, Risk 
and Digital Discrimination, edited by David Lyon, 2003, 68. 
52 Anton Alterman, “’A Piece of Yourself': Ethical Issues in Biometric Identification." Ethics and Information 
Technology 5, no. 3 (2003): 139-50. 
53 Georgio Agamben, "No to Biopolitical Tattooing." Le Monde, January 10, 2004. 
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information is inherently bad, regardless of whether or not it produces 
discriminatory effects. Bodily integrity is perhaps the most important moral good, 
and so there is something deeply wrong about another entity controlling an 
individual’s body.  
 
3.2.2 Why The Bodily Integrity Argument Fails  
If the bodily integrity argument were true, it would be a compelling justification 
for a special consideration of biometric information. However, I argue that this 
argument rests on a faulty assumption, and is therefore insufficient to support a 
distinct conception and regulation of biometric information.  
The bodily integrity argument can be summarized as follows:  
1. Autonomy is a fundamental moral good.  
2. Bodily integrity is an essential component of autonomy. 
3. Control over one’s own body is the definition of bodily integrity.  
4. Control over one’s own body is equivalent to control over information 
about one’s own body. 
5. Biometric information is information about an individual’s body.  
6. The collection, analysis, and sharing of biometric information constitutes a 
fundamental violation of bodily integrity.  
7. Biometric information should be conceived of and regulated as a unique 
category of personal information.  
 
I accept (1), (2), and (3). Autonomy, or freedom, has been defined in a variety of 
ways, depending upon context. John Stuart Mill describes what autonomy, or 
liberty, means in the following terms:  “The only part of the conduct of anyone for 
which he is amenable to society is that which concerns others. In the part which 
merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, 
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over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.”54 In other words, an 
individual must fully control his own body and mind in order to be considered 
autonomous. This conception of autonomy supports the first three premises of this 
argument, but is irrelevant to the remainder of the bodily integrity argument. 
The bodily integrity argument fails on premise (4); how can it be that 
control over one’s own body is equivalent to control over information about one’s 
own body? In constructing this equivalency, Alterman, Agamben, and van der 
Ploeg misunderstand what biometric information is. Implicit in each of their 
arguments is the assumption that biometric information is simply a digital 
rendering of the body. Emilio Mordini, in his handbook on biometric technology, 
describes this as “informatization of the body.”55 However, biometrics technologies 
do not simply transform a physical human body into a digital human body.  
Biometrics measure one specific physical attribute of a person and 
transform that attribute (or some sub-part of that attribute) into numerical code. 
Take fingerprints, for example. When a person is “fingerprinted,” he does not 
relinquish his bodily integrity. To store a fingerprint, the police capture an image 
of the actual fingerprint. They then enhance this image so that the exact details of 
the fingerprint become visible. Then, an algorithm extracts information related to 
the “minutiae points” of the fingerprint, which include ridge endings and 
                                                 
54 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1869. 
55 Emilio Mordini, "Ethics and Policy of Biometrics," Advances in Pattern Recognition Handbook of Remote 
Biometrics, 2009, 293-309. 
 34 
bifurcations. This information is translated into numerical code, which the police 
can later use to positively identify an individual.56  
While there are certainly reasons that it would be bad for police to have the 
capacity to uniquely identify an individual, there is no reason to believe that 
ownership of numerical code that relates to specific information about a person’s 
fingerprint in any way violates that person’s bodily integrity. If Person A has been 
fingerprinted, he still has full control of his own body. He can do whatever he 
wishes with his fingers. He alone decides where and how to move his body in the 
world; he even has the power to remove his own fingers if he desires. The police, 
on the other hand (or whatever entity has a numerical code that represents his 
fingerprints) cannot do anything with Person A’s fingers. They do not control his 
body. The owners of Person A’s numerical fingerprint code can only use that 
information to positively identify Person A if he is apprehended and fingerprinted 
again. Identification does not constitute a violation of bodily integrity.   
It is clear that a person need not have complete control over information 
about his body in order to have complete control over his body itself. 
Consequently, the bodily integrity argument fails. This conclusion has two 
consequences. First, it indicates that the bodily integrity argument is insufficient 
to justify a distinct conception and regulation of biometric information. Second, 
this conclusion dismantles another argument that follows from the bodily integrity 
argument. 
                                                 
56 Arun Ross, Jidnya Shah, and Anil K. Jain, "From template to image: Reconstructing fingerprints from 
minutiae points," IEEE transactions on pattern analysis and machine intelligence 29, no. 4, 2007.  
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The bodily integrity argument deals with the fundamental nature of 
biometric information. According to this argument, biometric information is 
sacred in a way that non-biometric information is not. Accordingly, Sutrop and 
Laas-Mikko, along with some of their peers, argue that it is especially bad to use 
biometric information to discriminate.57 This argument is distinct from the 
discrimination argument in that it does not attempt to class technologies based on 
their inherent discriminatory potential, but rather makes a normative claim about 
the discriminatory use of specifically biological and physiological information, as 
compared to other types of information. According to this argument, if all else is 
equal, the type of information used to discriminate is consequential.  
Consider the following scenario: a risk-assessment algorithm used to 
determine criminal sentences incorrectly classifies black individuals as high-risk at 
a higher rate than it classifies white individuals as high-risk. In one case, the 
program uses biometric information, like face geometry or gait. In another case, 
the program uses non-biometric personal information, like zip code and 
employment history. Both programs are equally discriminatory. Proponents of the 
bodily integrity argument would assert that because there is something 
fundamentally invasive about using biometric information, it is worse to use 
biometric information than non-biometric information, even if the two programs 
have the same effect. Because I reject the claim that the collection, use, and 
sharing of biometric information violate bodily integrity, I argue that neither 
                                                 
57 Margit Sutrop and Katrin Laas-Mikko, "From Identity Verification to Behavior Prediction.”  
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program is morally worse than the other. The moral issue is the discriminatory 
output, not the type of information input.  
The bodily integrity argument fails because control over one’s own body is 
not equivalent to control over information about one’s body. This analysis 
confirms that there is nothing fundamentally wrong about the collection, use, and 
sharing of biometric information. Furthermore, if a biometric technology has a 
discriminatory effect, that is problematic because discrimination is wrong, not 
because biometric information is inherently more valuable than other kinds of 
personal information. Therefore, the bodily integrity argument does not furnish 
sufficient justification for the distinct conception and regulation of biometric 
information.  
 
3.3 Personal Identity  
The personal identity argument is closely related to the bodily integrity argument, 
and shares many of the same defenses, although the two are sufficiently unique to 
require separate consideration. The personal identity argument asserts that 
biometric information is fundamentally more personal than non-biometric 
information. In other words, biometric information is central to an individual’s 
identity in a way that other information is not. Because biometric information 
differs from non-biometric information in its value to the individual and in its 
capacity to define a person’s core identity, it should be considered as a separate 
class of personal information and regulated accordingly.  
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 Proponents of the personal identity argument include Irma van der Ploeg 
and Emilio Mordini, both of whom assert that there is something deeply personal 
about biological information. Anton Alterman and Georgio Agamben also imply 
that biometric information is personal in a way that non-biometric information is 
not. I argue that there is nothing special about biometric information that renders 
it more personal than any other kind of personal information. In doing this, I reject 
the personal identity argument, the last of the main arguments in support of an 
independent and uniquely regulated class of biometric information.  
 
3.3.1 The Personal Identity Argument  
The personal identity argument asserts that biological and physiological 
information are the most personal kinds of information. The argument is generally 
grounded in the reductionist belief that we are our bodies. There is no further fact 
of identity. As such, it must be true that information about our bodies is most 
closely linked to personal identity. Therefore, biometric information—or 
information about our bodies—constitutes a distinct category of personal 
information and should be regulated according to different principles.  
 The personal identity argument rests upon the assumptions 1) that there is 
an objective means of determining what is more or less personal to an individual, 
and 2) that given a universal and objective determination of “personal-ness,” 
biometric information must be the most personal because persons, first and 
foremost, are concrete, physical beings in the world. I reject both of these 
assumptions.  
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3.3.2 Why The Personal Identity Argument Fails  
 
The personal identity argument is the least compelling of the three main 
justifications for a distinct conception and regulation of biometric information. 
However, it is worth considering the argument for two reasons. First, if the 
personal identity argument were true, it would constitute a justification (if a weak 
one) for the separate classification of biometric information. Second, the personal 
identity argument reveals a common misconception about the relationship 
between the physical body and personal identity. 
The personal identity argument can be summarized as follows:  
1. Persons are physical, concrete beings.  
2. Persons are their bodies.  
3. Bodies are represented by biological and physiological information.  
4. Biological and physiological information are the most personal kinds of 
information.  
5. Biometric information is biological and physiological.  
6. Biometric information is more personal than non-biometric information.  
7. Biometric information should be conceived of and regulated as a unique 
category of personal information.  
 
This argument fails on more than one premise. I am willing to grant (1) and (2), 
although these premises are not uncontroversial in themselves. The argument falls 
apart in (3) and (4), where it is asserted that bodies are represented, in their most 
personal form, by biological and physiological information. If a reductionist 
conception of personal identity is true, then all information about a person’s body 
is, in some way, physical and concrete. This does not mean, however, that all 
information about a person’s body is biological or physiological. Furthermore, a 
person’s existence as a concrete, physical being does not justify the claim that 
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biometric information is fundamentally more personal than non-biometric 
information.   
Van der Ploeg, in her defense of the personal identity argument, asserts that 
because she feels more connected to her body than to her rental car record, it must 
be true that biometric information is more personal than non-biometric 
information. It may be that Irma van der Ploeg actually does feel this way, but I 
would first like to challenge the way that she makes her argument. Van der Ploeg 
describes biometric information in vague terms, using the word “embodiment” to 
talk about the use of biometric technologies. She compares “embodiment” to 
specific examples of non-biometric personal information, like her social security 
number and her rental car records. This is an asymmetrical comparison. 
“Embodiment” is not the same kind of thing as a social security number. A more 
balanced account would compare an iris scan to a social security number, for 
example.  
Van der Ploeg also fails to acknowledge that some types of non-biometric 
information can be deeply personal. Information about where we live, the 
communities to which we are connected, the books we have read, the work we 
have produced, and so on. In fact, I would postulate that van der Ploeg might 
consider her own body of scholarship as an essential component of her personal 
identity, perhaps even more so than a collection of biological information (for 
example: a fingerprint, an iris scan, and a face scan).  
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I do not argue that non-biometric information is necessarily more personal 
than biometric information, but rather that the determination of how personal a 
certain kind of information is, is inherently subjective, and therefore cannot follow 
the kind of logic fundamental to the personal identity argument. I also argue that 
even if there were an objective means of determining what kind of personal 
information is the most personal, it is not intuitive that biometric information 
would be more personal than non-biometric information. Therefore, the personal 
identity argument does not justify the distinct conception and regulation of 
biometric information.  
 
3.4 Conclusions  
In this chapter, I reviewed three of the most compelling arguments in support of a 
distinct class of biometric information and explained why they are mistaken.  
First, I described the discrimination argument, which posits that biometric 
information is inherently more capable of discriminatory applications than other 
kinds of personal information. I demonstrated that this argument rests on the 
mistaken assumption that biology and physiology determine identity.  
Second, I described the bodily integrity argument, which asserts that the 
collection, use, and sharing of biometric information constitutes a violation of 
bodily integrity and individual autonomy. I showed that this argument is insolvent 
because it makes a false equivalency between control over one’s own body and 
control over information about one’s own body.  
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Finally, I described the personal identity argument, which contends that 
biometric information is fundamentally more personal than non-biometric 
information. I established that this argument fails to support its implied claim that 
there is an objective means of determining the “personal-ness” of information. I 
also explained that biological and physiological information is not any more 
meaningfully related to a person’s identity than other information. In many cases, 
non-biometric information is actually more personal.  
I outlined the most compelling arguments in support of a distinct 
conception and regulation of biometric information. I objected to each one, 
showing why and how it fails. In doing this, I also supported my argument that we 
should be more concerned with the application of personal information than the 
type of personal information used. Having demonstrated why it is unreasonable to 
conceive of biometric information as a discrete class of personal information, I 
now propose an alternative definition of biometrics.  
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4. An Alternative Framework 
Most philosophical reflections on biometrics tend to emphasize one issue over 
others—race and gender, personal identity, bodily integrity, or something else—
offering critical analysis of a narrow question, but failing to reflect on biometrics as 
a concept. While these commentaries are useful, they lack context. In order to 
fully understand these critiques—and more importantly, in order to apply them 
effectively in the realm of policy—we must organize them within a unified theory 
of biometric information. In other words, we need to develop a foundational 
understanding of what biometric information is before determining how it should 
be used. Complex critical analyses of biometric technologies will be useful only 
when they relate to a coherent conception of biometrics. 
While the FBI and many other agencies and institutions have already 
developed definitions of biometrics, these definitions remain inconsistent and 
imprecise. They fail to account for the distinction between hard and soft 
biometrics, first and second-generation biometrics, physiological and behavioral 
biometrics, and so on. The existing definitions of biometrics definitions might 
appear on their face to be complete and clear, but they quickly fall apart under 
interrogation. 
In this chapter, I propose an alternative model for understanding 
biometrics within the framework of personal information. First, I argue that 
“biologicalness” is not a binary property. Second, I show that “soft biometrics” do 
not resolve the inconsistencies inherent in current definitions of biometrics. 
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Finally, I develop a scalar model of personal information that accommodates 
biometric information.  
I have already argued that we should regulate personal information according to 
use rather than type. If we accept this position, then it might be unclear why we need a 
new framework or typology of personal information. There are three main reasons that 
this framework is useful. First, it serves to further bolster my argument in defense of an 
application-based approach to the regulation of personal information. A scalar model of 
personal information divorces the independent characteristics of personal information 
and demonstrates why it is misleading and unhelpful to group personal information into 
discrete categories. Second, this scalar model of personal information, while it should not 
and cannot be used to distinguish between kinds of personal information for the purpose 
of regulation, might be used to more precisely describe and compare different pieces of 
personal information. For example, biologists, social scientists, and government programs 
might find it useful to have the tools and vocabulary to determine which piece of 
information is more unique, which piece of information is more biological, which piece of 
information is more permanent, and so on. Finally, the scalar model of personal 
information that I propose helps unravel the metaphysics of personal information, 
independent of its application in the realms of policy and law. There is something 
intrinsically interesting and important about how personal information represents us, 
what its constituent attributes are, and how these might be used to describe us.  
 
4.1 The Biology Mistake  
All definitions of biometrics assume a binary definition of “biological.” Some 
definitions distinguish between “biological” and “behavioral” identifiers; while 
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others make the tacit assumption that all of the biometric identifiers listed are, by 
nature, “biological.” I argue that despite the language employed by various 
agencies and institutions to describe biometrics, “biological information” does not 
constitute a discrete category.  
It might seem obvious that a fingerprint or a DNA sample is biological and 
that a phone number is not. But upon further investigation, we can see that this is 
not entirely true. A fingerprint is mostly, but not exclusively, determined by 
biological factors. For example, professional violinists sometimes wear the pads of 
their fingers down so much that their fingerprints are unreadable by fingerprint 
identification technologies.58 Severe burns can have the same effect.  
There exist more obvious “borderline cases” than the fingerprint example. 
Take, for example, human voice patterns. It is unclear whether voice is an example 
of biological or non-biological information. Biological factors, including the size of 
a person’s diaphragm, the configuration of his vocal cords, and the shape of his 
larynx all contribute to a person’s voice patterns. However, social factors, including 
affect, accent, age, smoking status, and personality also influence a person’s voice 
patterns. Voice seems to be neither purely biological, nor purely non-biological.  
Voice is by no means the only borderline case. Other “biometric” identifiers, 
like gait, keystroke, body modifications, and hair color, all belong to this in-
between category. These examples illustrate the ambiguity of the word “biological.” 
If we define “biological”—in the context of biometrics—as information related to 
                                                 
58 Based on a conversation with a professional violinist, corroborated by an online message board. 
"1st Finger Scar." Violinist.com. http://www.violinist.com/discussion/response.cfm?ID=23209.  
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the human body, then we could consider almost any piece of personal information 
biological. This is clearly too broad a definition of the word.  
For the purpose of this discussion, I define “biological information” as 
information that is biologically determined. It is conceivable that we might 
someday develop a way to identify a person’s exact location based on his brain 
scans. However, the ability to measure a certain characteristic using secondary 
information about a person’s body is not sufficient to classify that characteristic as 
biological information. Location is not a piece of biological information. Biological 
information, at least with regard to biometric information, does not mean traits 
that are measurable through physical analysis of a person’s body. Instead, 
biological information means traits that are biologically determined. Fingerprints 
are primarily related to genetic factors, and are therefore primarily biological in 
nature. Social security numbers, on the other hand, are primarily related to 
environmental and social factors, and are therefore primarily non-biological in 
nature. 
This distinction, between biologically measurable and biologically 
determined traits, helps narrow our definition of biological information. We 
understand that fingerprints are mostly biologically determined and that phone 
numbers are mostly not. Traits like voice, gait, and hair color all have a 
combination of biological and non-biological determinants. Voice, as I described 
previously, is in part determined by factors like the shape of a person’s larynx, but 
is also influenced by factors like geographic region. Gait is determined by a 
 46 
person’s physiology, but also by profession, age, injury status, and even 
personality. Hair color has genetic factors, but can also be influenced by time 
spent in the sun and artificial dye. When philosophers, policymakers, and 
bioengineers write about biometric information, I think they generally mean 
biologically determined information. At least, I argue that this is closest to what 
they intend when they use the words “biological” or “non-biological.” Their 
mistake is in construing these categories as discrete. I call this “the biology 
mistake.” 
 
4.2 Why “Soft Biometrics” Fails to Resolve the Biology Mistake  
To account for the borderline cases—the biometric identifiers that are not easily 
described as either “biological” or “non-biological”—policymakers, scholars, and 
developers of biometric technologies developed a new category of information: 
soft biometrics. This new category of information was intended to capture all of 
the in-between biometric characteristics.  
The construction of a new category of biometrics, however, does not resolve 
the definitional problem. In fact, the soft biometrics category exacerbates the 
ambiguity already present in definitions of biometrics. “Soft biometrics” 
supposedly includes physiological and behavioral information. But as with the 
distinction between “biological” and “non-biological,” it is unclear what is the 
difference between “physiological” and “biological.” Similarly, there is no clear 
boundary between “behavioral information” and “non-biometric information.” In 
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adopting a more granular view of personal information, we further confuse, rather 
than clarify, the definition of biometrics.  
The organization of personal information into categories—hard biometrics, 
soft biometrics, and non-biometric personal information—contributes to a 
fundamental misunderstanding of personal information more broadly. Discrete 
categories imply that there are substantive differences between the kinds of 
information belonging to each category. It follows that those differences 
necessitate tailored policies and regulations. I argue that this understanding of 
personal information is faulty, and that it facilitates the creation and 
implementation of inconsistent and unsustainable policies as well as regulations. 
 
4.3 A Scalar Model of Personal Information  
There are many instances in which the organization of information or objects into 
discrete categories is useful, even if it is not accurate. For example, color exists 
along a spectrum. There is an unidentifiable point at which blue becomes green. 
Of course, we name colors that fall somewhere between blue and green: aqua, teal, 
and turquoise. (These blue-green words are analogous to “soft biometrics,” the 
term that describes information between biometric and non-biometric.) However, 
these names are crude, and fail to capture the infinity of colors that exist in the 
space between blue and green. This generalization is acceptable, though, because 
it enables us to communicate with each other and to describe our world.   
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Humans artificially constructed almost every category in our world. In the 
words of Jaegwon Kim, most categories are not natural kinds.59 We group people 
according to their race, gender, sexual orientation, and so on, despite the fact that 
few of these categories are uncontroversially discrete. The U.S. Census, for 
example, presents race categorically. A person can identify as White, Black or 
African-American, Asian, American Indian or Alaska Native, Native Hawaiian or 
Other Pacific Islander, Two or More Races, or Some Other Race. Quayshawn 
Spencer claims that these racial categories roughly mirror the population 
distribution of sub-species. Even if this is true, the categories are sufficiently broad 
to reflect what Spencer terms “fuzzy group membership.”60 In other words, the 
racial groups are clusters rather than discrete categories. Not every person belongs 
to a distinct racial identification. Regardless of how or why human awareness of 
racial groupings arose, the distinctions are important in our society today. We use 
the vocabulary of race to talk about opportunity, oppression, and discrimination. 
People of color often find it useful to identify with certain racial groups as a means 
of expressing solidarity.61 
We classify personal information in discrete categories: hard biometric 
information, soft biometric information, and non-biometric information. The 
creation of these categories represents an unsuccessful attempt to “carve nature at 
                                                 
59 Jaegwon Kim, "Concepts of supervenience," Philosophy and phenomenological research 45, no. 2, 1984, 153-
176. 
60 Quayshawn Spencer, "Philosophy of race meets population genetics," Studies in History and Philosophy of 
Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 2015, 46-55. 
61 Dennis Chong and Reuel Rogers, "Racial solidarity and political participation," Political Behavior 27, no. 4, 
2005, 347-374. 
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its joints.” But even a preliminary investigation reveals that these categories do not 
constitute natural kinds. The theory of natural kinds asserts that some kinds, or 
groupings, occur naturally in the world. Other kinds are artificially constructed 
and group things according to human interest rather than natural reality. In 
describing the ambiguity of the existing classifications of personal information, I 
hope I have effectively argued that “hard biometric information,” “soft biometric 
information,” and “non-biometric information” are not natural kinds. 
        However, even if we accept that these groupings of information are not 
natural kinds, one could argue that they are still useful. We artificially group 
things in the world all the time. Many of these groupings are very useful in practice. 
For example, “tables” are not a natural kind, but that does not invalidate the use of 
the “table” category to identify a certain kind of thing that we encounter regularly 
in our lives. I do not wish to imply that artificial groupings are always 
unproductive. It is evident that artificial groupings are often useful. Rather, I wish 
to distinguish between artificial kinds and natural kinds. Because biometric 
information is not a natural kind, we must evaluate whether or not this particular 
artificial grouping is useful. 
There is not sufficient evidence to indicate that the artificial grouping of 
personal information is helpful. The grouping of personal information is founded 
upon, and perpetuates, false assumptions about the normative value of different 
kinds of information. For example, biometric information—or information about 
the physical body—is assumed to be more personal and more easily manipulated 
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for the purposes of discrimination. Furthermore, the artificially constructed 
categories of personal information facilitate the development of narrowly tailored 
policies and laws, most of which are inconsistent and unsustainable.  
If personal information is scalar, as I argue below, it cannot be regulated 
according to type or category. Because personal information is a kind in and of 
itself—albeit with infinite variations—it should be regulated according to the use 
of personal information, rather than the “type” of information. The artificial 
grouping of personal information by type is unhelpful because it produces a 
specific legal and regulatory response that is predicated upon imprecise categories. 
Formal legislation and regulation regarding the collection, analysis, and sharing of 
“biometric information” is relatively new. Biometric policies and laws attempt to 
assign particular standards to “biometric information,” distinguishing it from other 
kinds of personal information. In practice, these regulations and policies will fall 
apart, especially as it becomes clear that it is impossible to distinguish biometric 
information from non-biometric information. I return to the practical implications 
of narrowly tailored legal standards for biometric information in the next chapter.  
While the artificial grouping of personal information by type is not useful, I 
do not make the same argument for the categorization of use, or application. 
Because the regulation of personal information should be legislated based on 
application rather than type of information, it makes sense to distinguish between 
different kinds of applications. For example, we might distinguish between 
applications that discriminate against individuals based on their identities, 
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applications that infringe on individuals’ right to privacy, and applications that 
help individuals protect their personal information. Like all artificial kinds, these 
are not clear-cut categories and will require definition and interpretation by 
lawmakers and judges. Despite the challenge of delineating between these kinds of 
applications, these distinctions will be much more useful in regulation how 
personal information is used than the classification of types of personal 
information.  
I argue for a scalar model of personal information. According to this model, 
there are no distinctions between “hard biometrics,” “soft biometrics,” and non-
biometric personal information. Instead, personal information is characterized by 
four factors: biologicalness, uniqueness, permanence, and personalness. These 
factors are related, but not interdependent. I propose a model in which each factor 
is weighted according to a ratio of determinants, or scale of magnitude. I 
acknowledge that the ratio method I propose is simplistic and does not account for 
the potency of each determinant. For example, it is possible that voice has a 
handful of biological determinants and dozens of non-biological determinants. 
This does not necessarily mean that voice is more non-biological than biological; 
diaphragm size might be the primary determinant of voice, even if there are many 
more social and environmental factors that contribute to a person’s voice pattern. 
If we are to use this scalar model in practice, we must find a way to account for the 
potency or magnitude of each determinant. However, for the purposes of 
describing the theory of this model, I will assume that each determinant 
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contributes equally to the character of each piece of personal information. Despite 
this simplification, the model that I describe below clearly illustrates the scalar 
nature of personal information, demonstrating that it does not naturally or easily 
fall into discrete categories.  
 
4.3.1 Biologicalness 
Biologicalness is the degree to which a piece of personal information is defined by 
biological determinants. Biological determinants, as I explained above, are factors 
related directly to the body. The ratio of biological to non-biological determinants 
establishes the biologicalness of a given piece of information. For example, hair 
color is determined by DNA (a biological determinant) and by sun exposure, diet, 
and the application of hair dye (non-biological determinants). The ratio of these 
determinants measures the biologicalness of a piece of personal information. A 1:0 
ratio of biological to non-biological determinants indicates that a piece of 
information is very biological. A 0:1 ration of biological to non-biological 
determinants indicates that a piece of information is not biological at all.  
 
4.3.2 Uniqueness 
Uniqueness is the degree to which a singular piece of information can uniquely 
identify an individual. Something like hair color, for example, cannot uniquely 
identify an individual. There are billions of brunettes in the world. Something like 
a social security number, however, can uniquely identify an individual. A social 
security number is very unique. A zip code is moderately unique. Hair color is not 
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unique at all. We can measure uniqueness according to the approximate number 
of people that a given piece of information can identify. To simplify the measure, 
we place all 7 billion humans on a scale from 1-100. A piece of information that 
identifies only one unique individual receives a uniqueness score of 1. A piece of 
information that identifies all 7 billion individuals receives a uniqueness score of 
100. A piece of personal information that identifies some number of people 
between 1 and 7 billion receives a uniqueness score somewhere in between 1 and 
100.  
 
4.3.3 Permanence 
Permanence is the degree to which a piece of personal information persists, 
unchanged, over time. Something like a DNA sequence, for example, is very 
permanent. It never changes. Something like weight, on the other hand, is not 
permanent at all. Weight changes constantly. According to this metric, DNA is 
very permanent. Hair color is somewhat permanent. Address is not very 
permanent. Weight is not permanent at all. We can measure permanence 
according to the number of years that a piece of personal information remains 
unchanged. To simplify the measure, we place time on a scale from 1-100. A piece 
of information that changes constantly receives a score of 1. A piece of information 
that never changes receives a score of 100. A piece of information that changes 
over the course of a person’s life receives a score somewhere between 1 and 100.  
 
 54 
4.3.4 Personalness 
Personalness is the degree to which a person considers a piece of information 
fundamental to his personal identity. This factor differs from the others in that it is 
subjective. However, it is still possible to measure the personalness of a piece of 
information. Ask an individual to consider all personal information according to 
the magnitude of its relevance to his personal identity. The personal information 
that is least relevant to an individual’s personal identity receives a score of 1. The 
personal information that is most relevant to an individual’s personal identity 
receives a score of 100. If I consider something like my phone number irrelevant to 
my personal identity, that piece of information receives a score of 1. If I consider 
the library of books that I have read throughout my life the most fundamental to 
my identity, that piece of information receives a score of 100. Information that is 
somewhat relevant to my personal identity receives a score somewhere between 1 
and 100.  
 
4.4 Conclusions  
In this chapter, I described the Biology Mistake. Policymakers, ethicists, and 
software developers tend to conceive of “biological” as a binary descriptor of 
personal information. In fact, personal information is neither biological nor non-
biological; it tends to fall somewhere between two ends of the spectrum. The 
Biology Mistake is the mistaken assumption that biological information is binary, 
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and therefore that biometric information constitutes a discrete category of 
personal information. 
“Soft biometrics” fails to resolve the Biology Mistake. The definition of “soft 
biometrics” is as ill defined as the definition of “hard biometrics,” and is therefore 
unhelpful in categorizing personal information and determining how best to 
regulate it.  
 Finally, I introduced the scalar model of personal information. This model 
consists of four factors: biologicalness, uniqueness, permanence, and personalness. 
Each factor is measured by degree. In separating these factors, I demonstrate that 
while they may be related, they are not interdependent. Furthermore, the 
attributes belonging to a piece of personal information do not necessarily carry 
normative value. This supports my claim that personal information should be 
regulated not by its descriptive attributes, but by the way in which it is used.    
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5. Implications  
In Chapter 3, I identified the most compelling arguments in support of a 
categorical model of personal information. I addressed these arguments, 
explaining why each one fails. In Chapter 4, I proposed an alternative model of 
personal information, one in which biometric information does not constitute a 
discrete category. I contended that personal information is defined by four 
attributes, each of which can be measured according to a ratio or a scale of 
magnitude. In disentangling these attributes from one another, I demonstrated 
that “biometrics”—and more specific groupings of personal information, such as 
“hard biometrics” and “soft biometrics”—are unhelpful and inaccurate. I suggested 
that this model of personal information provides insight into how we might begin 
develop more consistent and sustainable policies and laws.  
In this chapter, I illustrate the theoretical arguments that I defended in 
Chapters 3 and 4. In particular, I focus on the implications of my findings for the 
international regulation of personal information. First, I compare two case studies 
in order to show that intuitions regarding the collection, use, and analysis of 
different kinds of personal information are not necessarily logical or helpful. I also 
use these case studies to demonstrate how a scalar model better describes and 
interprets the use of personal information. 
Second, I suggest how we might integrate a scalar model of personal 
information into information policy and law. I argue against narrow biometrics 
legislation and in favor of a more principled, consequentialist approach to 
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information policy and law. I then extend these conclusions to the realm of 
international information policy.  
 
5.1 Case Studies   
I present two case studies to ground my theoretical arguments in the real world. 
The first describes U.S. military “biometric” intelligence programs in Afghanistan. 
The second briefly describes U.S. military “non-biometric” intelligence programs in 
Afghanistan. A comparative analysis of these cases reveals that the differences 
between the two programs—and by extension, differences between types of 
information collected—are not substantively or normatively significant. 
Furthermore, these case studies support a neutral approach to interpretation and 
regulation of information technology.   
 
5.1.1 “Biometric” Intelligence in Afghanistan 
In 2012, the Economist published a story about the U.S. military and its use of 
biometrics in Afghanistan. The article described a “ghoulish ritual” in which U.S. 
soldiers capture fingerprints and iris scans from the corpses of Taliban fighters and 
enter them into a massive database.62 This was not the first article to report on the 
use of biometric surveillance tactics by the U.S. military. However, its tone and 
focus reflected American discomfort with biometrics; the article casts the new 
program as part of an invasive surveillance agenda commandeered by a soulless, 
dystopian, sci-fi military.  
                                                 
62 "The eyes have it," The Economist, July 07, 2012, http://www.economist.com/node/21558263. 
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In 2007, General David H. Petraeus commanded a “biometric surge” in 
Afghanistan. Under Petraeus, the United States military rolled out a massive data 
collection program.63 The ultimate goal of the program was “identity dominance,” 
or the “ability to identify and track every single human being in the country and, in 
the process, make it impossible for the Taliban and other insurgents to live 
undetected among civilian populations.”64 While the U.S. military has not yet 
achieved identity dominance in Afghanistan, the Department of Defense biometric 
database, as of 2010, had stored information about almost one million Afghan 
citizens.65 The Department of Defense shares this information with the 
Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and 
intelligence agencies in other nations with which the U.S. has intelligence sharing 
partnerships.66 There is little to no oversight of inter-agency and transnational 
data sharing.  
According to a report by Public Intelligence, “there is no formal doctrine or 
universally accepted tactics, techniques, and procedures for using biometrics 
throughout the U.S. military.”67 This information is presented as extraordinary—
likely because it deals specifically with biometric information—even though it does 
                                                 
63 Thom Shanker, "To Track Militants, U.S. Has System That Never Forgets a Face," The New York Times, July 
13, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/14/world/asia/14identity.html. 
64 Sean Gallagher, "Military looks to upgrade its “tactical biometrics” with Identity Dominance System 2," Ars 
Technica, October 09, 2015, https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2015/10/military-looks-to-
upgrade-its-tactical-biometrics-with-identity-dominance-system-2/. 
65 Jon Boone, "US army amasses biometric data in Afghanistan," The Guardian, October 27, 2010, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/oct/27/us-army-biometric-data-afghanistan.  
66 "Identity Dominance: The U.S. Military’s Biometric War in Afghanistan," Public Intelligence, April 24, 2014, 
https://publicintelligence.net/identity-dominance/.  
67 Ibid.  
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not represent a departure from the protocols (or lack thereof) governing any other 
military intelligence program.  
Not only is the biometric “doctrine” remarkably vague, but the scope of the 
data-collection program is also ill-defined. General Petraeus ordered a “biometric 
surge,” but the program included the collection of fingerprints, iris scans, facial 
images, and biographical data and additional imagery, including "name, age, 
height, weight, birthplace, nationality, scars, marks, and tattoos," according to 
Marine Corps documents.68 This information is by no means universally “biological” 
in nature; the identifiers include a large range of personal information. 
It is important to note that the Afghan government also contributes 
significantly to this massive data collection program. A study published in the 
National Defense University’s Joint Force Quarterly described the Afghan National 
Security Court as a “model for successful use of biometric evidence in criminal 
prosecutions.”69 This Court relies heavily on “biometric” evidence to link 
defendants to forensic evidence. The U.S. has encouraged the Afghan government 
to expand its biometric program, urging Hamid Karzai, the former Afghan 
president, to collect fingerprints and iris scans for all Afghan citizens, starting at 
age 16.70 It is clear that the U.S. Department of Defense has guided the creation 
                                                 
68 Sean Gallagher, "Military looks to upgrade its “tactical biometrics” with Identity Dominance System 2," Ars 
Technica, October 09, 2015, https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2015/10/military-looks-to-
upgrade-its-tactical-biometrics-with-identity-dominance-system-2/. 
69 Ibid.  
70 Jon Boone, "US army amasses biometric data in Afghanistan," The Guardian, October 27, 2010, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/oct/27/us-army-biometric-data-afghanistan.  
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and management of Afghanistan’s domestic biometric program, and has absolute 
access to the national database.  
Afghan government officials have justified the biometric surveillance 
project, in a country where individual identification programs were practically 
nonexistent prior to U.S. military intervention, by appealing to its potential to curb 
fraud and corruption.71 The commander of the U.S. Army’s Task Force on 
Biometrics, Colonel Craig Osborne, said that the collection of biometric data is not 
useful only for the identification of terrorists and criminals, but that “it can be 
used to enable progress in society and has countless applications for the provision 
of services to the citizens of Afghanistan.”72 These endorsements of the new 
surveillance systems represent an attempt to justify the military program by 
demonstrating its potential benefits to civil society.  
Despite claims that widespread biometric surveillance is a public good, 
skeptics assert that Afghanistan’s “shaky commitment to the rule of law” means 
that the identifiers collected could easily be turned into weapons.73 In Iraq, where 
the U.S. has rolled out a similar “biometric surge,” privacy advocates worry that the 
biometrics database might be repurposed as a military hit list, especially because 
of widespread corruption, fraud, and malice in local police forces and military 
units.74 Privacy advocates in the United States also mounted significant resistance 
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to the military’s biometric program, and have vehemently opposed its imposition 
on American citizens.75  
The “biometric” intelligence program in Afghanistan, whatever its 
normative implications, generated more discourse, both domestically and abroad, 
than almost any other military intelligence program. Apart from the 
implementation of some new technologies, the “biometric surge” in Afghanistan 
does not differ significantly from other intelligence efforts. As such, the rhetoric 
surrounding this program reflects, at the very least, heightened public interest in 
“biometrics.”   
 
5.1.2 “Non-Biometric” Intelligence in Afghanistan  
While civilians in both the United States and Afghanistan paid significant 
attention to the “biometric surge” in Afghanistan, similar intelligence programs 
had been quietly underway in the Middle East and elsewhere for many years. Since 
World War II—perhaps even since World War I—U.S. intelligence agencies have 
relied on both human and signals intelligence to collect information on the ground 
and to inform military strategy. Apart from occasional outrage related to the use of 
“enhanced interrogation tactics,” most military intelligence work goes largely 
unnoticed by the public.  
The pursuit of Osama bin Laden involved cooperation between the CIA, the 
FBI, the NSA, Afghan intelligence agencies, and Pakistani intelligence agencies. 
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This information was also shared with Australia, the United Kingdom, New 
Zealand, and Canada through the Five Eyes multilateral intelligence network.76 
Intelligence strategies included “enhanced interrogation techniques” (i.e. torture), 
the widespread surveillance of cellphone communications, and targeted human 
intelligence.77 
In Afghanistan, the so-called “non-biometric” intelligence strategies involve 
the extensive collection of information about both military insurgents and regular 
civilians for the purpose of achieving military objectives. Intelligence operatives 
collect personal information, including photographs, names, physical 
characteristics, and many other identifiers that were classified as “biometric” in the 
discourse on the Afghan “biometric surge.” The difference between “biometric” 
intelligence programs in Afghanistan and “non-biometric” intelligence programs in 
Afghanistan was primarily terminological.  
 
5.1.3 A Comparative Analysis  
 
Even a cursory analysis of these two case studies reveals two important facts. First, 
there is no substantive or normative difference in the kind of information collected. 
The “biometric” intelligence program included the collection of information 
ranging from fingerprint to tribal affiliation. Similarly, the “non-biometric” 
intelligence program included the collection of information ranging birthmarks to 
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cell phone records. In effect, the two programs are indistinguishable. They both 
involve the collection, use, and sharing of all different kinds of personal 
information.  
The second fact that comparative analysis of these case studies reveals is 
that the problems associated with the widespread collection of information has 
more to do with the method of data collection and the practice of data analysis 
and sharing than with the kind of information collected. In some cases, the 
collection of information was ethically problematic (e.g. taking iris scans from 
corpses and using “enhanced interrogation techniques”). In all cases, the collection, 
use, and sharing of personal information was almost entirely driven by the U.S. 
military and unregulated by any external authority. However, these problems did 
not derive from the type of information collected, but rather from the method of 
information collection and the practices of information sharing.  
Melvin Kranzberg, a leading technology theorist, best explains the intuitive 
objection to supposedly “biometric” technologies. Kranzberg finds that people 
often laud or abhor certain practices because they are new technologies. He argues 
that the justifications for these reactions are mistaken. According to Kranzberg’s 
First Law of Technology, “technology is neither good nor bad; nor is it neutral.”78 
In other words, technology is an empty vessel created by and for humans, and 
consequently has no inherent normative value. This analysis extends to our 
discussion of biometrics. The biologicalness of a piece of information is a non-
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normative fact. That information alone does not render a piece of information 
more or less dangerous.  
 
5.3 Biometrics and Information Policy 
My primary goal is to redefine “biometrics” within a scalar model of personal 
information. Specific policy and legislative applications are beyond the scope of 
this paper. However, I want to suggest how my scalar model of personal 
information might be relevant to information policy, particularly in an 
international context. First, I explain why narrow biometric policies and laws are 
inconsistent and unsustainable. Next, I propose how a universal understanding of 
biometrics will facilitate a more consistent transnational ethic of personal 
information. Even if international regulations contradict each other, it is useful to 
have a more explicit model for understanding and classifying personal information.  
 
5.3.1 Against Narrow Legislation  
Several states in the U.S. have passed bills regulating the collection and use of 
biometric information. Texas and Illinois both have both recently passed specific 
biometrics bills. Washington State is in the process of passing its own biometrics 
bill. Each of these laws defines biometrics in slightly different terms. But even if 
the definitions of biometrics were identical, it would soon become evident that it is 
impossible to coherently and consistently apply these laws. A piece of legislation 
that concerns only biometric information requires law enforcement agents and 
courts to distinguish between biometric and non-biometric information. These 
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laws do not apply to non-biometric information. However, because biometric 
information is not a discrete category, this is an impossible task. The application of 
these bills will result in inconsistent case law. Legislatures will have to revise the 
laws constantly as new technologies emerge.  
 There is an alternative to this option. Legislatures can develop principled 
regulations of personal information that concern the methods of collection, the 
effects of application, and the standards for sharing. In creating broader 
regulations, the laws will clearly reflect the values of the governing bodies. 
Furthermore, they will persist over time and evolve alongside the development of 
new technologies and the emergence of new “kinds” of personal information.   
 
5.3.2 International Biometrics Regulation  
The question of how to define biometrics, and how to govern the collection, use, 
and sharing of personal information more broadly, is inherently transnational in 
nature. Data are not limited by borders, and are therefore immune to most 
national protections. There are many contexts in which personal information is 
collected and shared internationally. My case studies focused on military 
intelligence, but personal data are also collected and shared by private entities 
such as multinational corporations, banks, and social media platforms. 
 It is wildly optimistic to presume that a consistent model of personal 
information will translate to a consistent model of transnational information 
policy and regulation. At the very least, however, a model of personal information 
that accommodates all different kinds of information, and that can evolve 
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alongside new technologies and new information pathways will facilitate clear 
communication—across borders as well as cultures—about the regulation of 
personal information.  
 
5.4 Conclusions  
In this chapter, I illustrated the practical implications of the theoretical arguments 
I defended in Chapters 3 and 4. I compared two case studies of military 
intelligence in Afghanistan to show how the type of personal information is 
irrelevant to the normative implications of the collection, use, and sharing of 
personal information. Furthermore, it is almost impossible to determine what is 
considered “biometric” and is considered “non-biometric” information. This is 
because “biometric information” does not constitute a discrete category of 
personal information.  
I also proposed how a scalar model of personal information might inform 
information policy and law. I argued against narrow biometrics legislation and 
suggest that broader, more principled laws will be more consistent and sustainable. 
I then argued that while no model of personal information will resolve the 
problem of international fragmentation in law enforcement, a consistent and 
coherent model of personal information would, at the very least, guide 
communication about the transnational regulation of personal information.   
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6. Conclusion  
On January 28, 2001, 71,921 people cheered and booed in the Raymond James 
Stadium in Tampa, Florida. They were football fans; none of them yet knew or 
cared that their faces were scanned, transformed into code, and deposited in a 
database of digital mug shots. Later, when the news broke that the FBI had used 
the Super Bowl as a testing ground for its new biometric software, technology 
policy analysts, lawyers, and concerned citizens would express their outrage at the 
mass collection of biometric information.  
But their response was misdirected. While the public had every right to take 
issue with the FBI program, they should have realized that the fundamental 
problem had nothing to do with the type of information collected. The FBI could 
have gathered the fingerprints, addresses, or even political identification of each 
fan. It would not have mattered. It is the method of data collection, the use of 
personal information, and the storage of that personal information with which the 
public should have been concerned. The FBI might have violated principles of 
consent. They might have used the data in ways that infringed upon the 
constitutional rights of American citizens. They might have stored personal 
information in a system with insufficient protections. These are all dilemmas 
worth considering and addressing.  
In this paper, I argued that biometric information does not constitute a 
discrete class of personal information. More broadly, I showed that the type of 
information collected is irrelevant to the legal and ethical consideration of a 
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personal information technology or program. I proposed a scalar model of 
personal information that describes each piece of data according to the magnitude 
of its biologicalness, uniqueness, permanence, and personalness. At the very least, 
this model provides a common vocabulary and the necessary tools to accurately 
describe the nature of personal information.  
My findings here are preliminary. I have developed a model that might give 
us some of the necessary tools to build a more consistent and durable regulatory 
framework, both domestically and internationally. Looking forward, we can 
consider how to incorporate a more scalar model of personal information into 
statutory law, how to apply it in the nebulous and secretive context of military 
intelligence, and how to use it to effectively regulate the transnational flow of 
personal information.  
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